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We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to
maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous
outcomes) and cannot use any monetary incentives. The planner recommends actions to agents, but her
recommendations need to be Bayesian Incentive Compatible to be followed by the agents.
Our main result is an optimal algorithm for the planner, in the case that the actions realizations are
deterministic and have limited support, making significant important progress on this open problem. Our
optimal protocol has two interesting features. First, it always completes the exploration of a priori more
beneficial actions before exploring a priori less beneficial actions. Second, the randomization in the protocol
is correlated across agents and actions (and not independent at each decision time).
CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation → Online learning theory.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: bayesian incentive-compatible; exploration versus exploitation; multi-
arm bandit
ACM Reference Format:
Lee Cohen and Yishay Mansour. 2019. Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration. In
ACM EC ’19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC ’19), June 24–28, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA.
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 28 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329581
1 INTRODUCTION
The inherent trade-off between exploration and exploitation is at the core of any reactive learning
algorithm. Multi-arm bandit is a simple model which highlights this inherent trade-off. Multi-arm
bandits can model a variety of scenarios, including pricing (where the actions are prices), recom-
mendation (e.g., where actions are news articles) and many other settings. To a large part, multi-
arm bandit is viewed as a model for learning and optimization in which the planner can select
any available action. However, when we are considering human agents as the entities perform-
ing the action, then incentives become a major issue. While a planner can recommend actions
to the agents (in order to explore different alternatives), the agents ultimately decide whether to
follow the given recommendation. This raises the issue of incentives in addition to the exploration-
exploitation trade-off. The planner can induce explorations in many ways. The simplest is using
monetary transfers, paying the agents in order to explore (for example, Frazier et al. [7]). We are
interested in the case when the social planner is unable or prefers to avoid any monetary transfers.
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(This can be due to regulatory constraints, business model, social norms, or any other reason.) The
main advantage of the planner in our model is the information asymmetry, namely, the fact that
the planner has much more information than the agents. As a motivating example for information
asymmetry, consider a GPS driving application. The application (social planner) is recommend-
ing to the drivers (agents) the best route to drive (action), given the changing road delays, and
observes the actual road delays when the route is driven. While the application can recommend
driving routes, ultimately, the driver decides which route to actually drive. The application needs
periodically to send drivers on exploratory routes, where it has uncertainty regarding the actual
delay, in order to observe their delay. The driver is aware that the application has updated infor-
mation regarding the current delays on various roads. For this reason, the driver would be willing
to follow the recommendation even if she knows that there is a small probability that she is asked
to explore. On the other extreme, if the driver would assume that with high probability a certain
recommended route has a higher delay, she might drive an alternate route. This inherent balancing
of exploration and exploitation while satisfying agents’ incentives, is at the core of this work.
The abstract model that we consider is the following. There is a finite set of actions, and for
each action there is a prior distribution on its rewards. A social planner is faced with a sequence
of myopic selfish agents, and each agent appears only once. The social planner would like to
maximize the social welfare, the sum of the agents’ utilities. The social planner recommends to
each agent an action, and if the recommendation is Bayesian incentive compatible (henceforth,BIC),
the agent will follow the action. This model was presented in Kremer et al. [10] and studied in [11–
13]. The work of Kremer et al. [10] presented an optimal algorithm for the social planner in the
case of two actions with deterministic outcome. (Deterministic outcome implies that each time the
action is performed we receive the same reward, and the uncertainty is what that value will be,
which is governed by the prior distribution.)
Our main focus is to make progress on this important open problem of providing an optimal
policy for this setting for any number of actions. For this end, we consider a somewhat more
restricted setting, where each action has a finite support. If we assume that there are only two pos-
sible values, say {−1,+1}, then the task becomes trivial. We can simply order the agents according
to the actions’ expectation, and ask them to explore until we reach an action of value +1, and
then recommend it forever. This would work even if we provide the agents with the realizations
of the previous actions. In this work we take a small, yet significant, step away from this trivial
model. We assume that the best a priori action has a larger support. For the most part we analyze
the case that the support of the a priori best action is {−1, 0,+1}, while the other actions have
support {−1,+1}. We later extend our results to handle a more general setting of any continuous
distribution with full support on [−1, 1] for the a priori best action (in Section 5).
Our simple model has a significant complexity and allows us to draw a few interesting insights.
To understand the challenges, consider the case where the actions have a negative expected reward.
(For simplicity, we assume that the actions are sorted by their expected reward, where action 1 has
the highest expectation.) In such a case, if the realization of action 1 is +1, clearly the planner
would recommend it for all the following agents. If the realization of action 1 is −1, clearly any
other action is superior to it. However, the challenging case occurs when the realization of action
1 is 0. In this case, the selfish agents would prefer to perform action 1 with 0 reward (since other
actions have negative expected reward). The challenge to the social planner is to incentivize the
agents to explore. The main idea is that of information asymmetry. When the planner recommends
action 2, the agent is unsure whether the social planner observed that outcome of action 1 is −1,
in which she would like to perform it, or whether the social planner observed that the outcome
is 0 and asks the agent to explore. The social planner, by a delicate balancing of the exploration
probability, can make the recommendation BIC.
Our main result is an optimal algorithm for the social planner when faced with k actions, both
for support {−1, 0,+1} and [−1,+1] for the best apriori action. First, the algorithm makes sure
that the BIC constraints are tight, which is a simple intuitive requirement and is clearly required
for optimality. However, we need to exhibit much more refined properties to construct an optimal
algorithm. An interesting issue regarding the exploration order is whether when we force a tight
BIC constraint we might be forced to explore an action j before we know the values of actions
1, . . . , j − 1 (that have better expected reward than action j). We show that this is not the case in
the optimal algorithm, namely, the exploration of action j starts only after the social planner knows
the realizations of all the better a priori actions, i.e., 1, . . . , j − 1. While this seems like an intuitive
outcome, it relies on the very delicate way in which our algorithm performs its randomization.
(Recall that the recommendation algorithm uses randomization to balance between exploring and
exploiting.)
The implementation of the randomization is the second interesting property of our algorithm.
In our randomization, we use a correlation between agents and actions. Specifically, the random-
ization selects for each action a random agent that might potentially explore it (if needed). Special
care needs to be taken to make sure that for different unexplored actions we always select different
agents.
We show that our algorithm does not only maximize the social welfare but in addition minimize
the exploration time, the time until the social planner does not need to explore any more. For the
most part we assume that the number of agents is large enough that the social planner completes
the exploration. We show also how to derive the optimal policy in the case of a limited number of
agents.
Related works
As mentioned, the work of Kremer et al. [10] presented the model and derived the optimal policy
for two deterministic actions. Mansour et al. [11] derive tight asymptotic regret bound in the case
of stochastic actions as well as a reduction from an arbitrary non-BIC policy to a BIC one. Bahar
et al. [1] enrich the model by embedding the agents in a social network, and allowing them to
observe their neighbors. Mansour et al. [12] extended the model to allow a multi-agent game in
each time step, rather than a single agent. Mansour et al. [13] consider the case of two competing
planners.
Frazier et al. [7] consider a model with monetary transfers, where the social planner can pay
agents to explore. Che andHörner [3] consider a setting with two binary-valued actions and contin-
uous information flow and a continuum of agents. Finally, Slivkins [14] has an excellent overview
of the topic.
Another related topic is that of Bayesian Persuasion by Kamenica and Gentzkow [9] where the
planner tries to infer a value of an “unobservable” state using interaction with multiple agents. See
[4–6] for a more algorithmic perspective of Bayesian Persuasion.
Multi-armed bandit [2, 8] is a well-studied model for exploration-exploitation trade-off both in
operations research and machine learning. The main focus in learning multi-arm bandits is on
designing efficient algorithms that have a guaranteed performance compared to the best single
action.
2 MODEL
Let A := {1, 2, ...,k} be the set of possible actions. The prior distribution D = D1 × D2 × ... × Dk
defines random variables X j for the rewards of actions j ∈ A. The reward of action j ∈ A, denoted
by x j , is sampled from D j (it is sampled once, and any application of action j yields the same
reward x j ). The prior expected reward of action j is µ j := ED j [X j ], and for notational convenience
we assume that µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µk .
In this work we focus on the case that the support of distribution of D1 is {−1, 0,+1} (the case
of support [−1, 1] appears in Section 5). The support of distribution D j , for j ≥ 2, is {+1,−1}.
We denote by pαj := Pr[X j = α], which implies that the distribution D j , for j ≥ 2, has a single
parameter, p1j (and p
−1
j = 1 − p
1
j ). We assume that p
1
j > 0, otherwise the action has a constant
reward of −1.
The interaction between the planner and the agents proceeds as follows. At time t , the t-th
agent arrives, and the planner recommends to the t-th agent action σt ∈ A, which is called the
recommended action. Given the recommended action σt , the t-th agent selects an action at , receives
a reward xat , and leaves. Formally, the t-th agent has a utility function, ut , and ut (a) = xa if action
a has been explored, else E[ut (a)] = µa . A history at time t , ht , contains all the previous chosen
actions by the agents, i.e., a1, . . . ,at , and their corresponding rewards, xa1 , . . . , xat . A strategy for
the planner is a recommendation policy, π , where πt (ht−1) = vt ∈ ∆(A), where ∆(A) is the set of
distributions over A, i.e., ∆(A) = {vt ∈ R
k |∀j ∈ A,vt [j] ≥ 0 and Σ
k
j=1vt [j] = 1}. The value of vt [j]
is the probability that σt = j , i.e., vt [j] = Pr[σt = j].
A recommended action, σt , is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) if for any action j ∈ A, we
have E[ut (σt ) − ut (j)|D, π ,σt , t] ≥ 0.
1 Such constrains are called BIC constrains. I.e., if σt is BIC
then there is no other action j ∈ A that can increase agent t ’s expected reward, based on the
prior D, the policy π , the recommended action σt , and the agent’s place in line t , all of which are
known to agent t before selecting an action (note that the agents do not observe the history ht−1).
A recommendation policy for the planner, π , is BIC if all it’s recommendations are BIC. Namely,
for any agent t and any history with positive probability ht−1, the recommendation σt is BIC.
The social welfare is the expected cumulative reward of all the agents. The social welfare of a
BIC recommendation policy π is: SWT (π ) := E[Σ
T
t=1ut (σt )] = E[Σ
T
t=1ut (πt (ht−1))].
The Bayesian prior D on the rewards, is a common knowledge to the planner as well as all the
agents. W.l.o.g, we restrict the planner’s recommendation policy to be BIC, which assures that the
agents follow the recommended actions. Ourmain goal is to design a BIC algorithm thatmaximizes
social welfare (i.e., the cumulative reward of the agents).
3 OPTIMAL BIC ALGORITHM FOR k ACTIONS
We start with a simpler case that will have most of the ingredients of the more general case. We
restrict the first action to have only three possible values {−1, 0, 1}, namely, the support of D1 is
{−1, 0, 1}. The second restriction is that we assume that there are only three actions, i.e., k = 3.
The terminology is provided for k-actions settings, but some of the intuition and motivation are
provided for three actions settings. The proofs appear in Appendix A. The algorithm for the general
case of k > 3 actions, and some of its proofs are in the appendix B.
Given this special case, we claim that the challenging case is when 0 > µ2 > µ3. In the case that
µ1 > µ2 > µ3 > 0, we can simply recommend to the first agent action 1, i.e., σ1 = 1. When we
observe x1, then: (1) If x1 = 1, we recommend to all the agents action 1, i.e., σt = 1. (2) If x1 = 0 or
x1 = −1, we recommend to the second agent action 2, i.e., σ2 = 2. This is BIC since µ2 > 0 ≥ x1 in
this case. If x2 = 1 we recommend to all the agents σt = 2. Otherwise, x2 = −1, and we recommend
to the third agent action 3, i.e., σ3 = 3. Again, this is BIC since µ3 > 0 ≥ x1 ≥ x2. Either way, all
the agents after the first three will be performing the optimal action. The above policy maximizes
social welfare even if we do not restrict the information flow, and the planner announces to the
1The expectation is implicitly conditioned on the actions that were selected by the previous agents, as it conditioned on
the policy, the prior and the agent’s place in line.
agents the actions’ realizations. In the case that µ1 > µ2 > 0 > µ3, we can execute for the first
two agents the above strategy, and essentially reduce the number of actions to two, for which the
optimal policy was given by Kremer et al. [10]. For this reason, we assume that 0 > µ2 > µ3. (And
for k actions, we assume 0 > µ2 > · · · > µk .)
To build intuition we start with a simple example, in order to explain how a BIC policy can give
a recommendation σt , 1.
Example 3.1. Consider a recommendation σt = 2 to agent t . The possible reasons for it is one
of the following:
(1) Exploitation driven recommendation: Action 2 is the best action given the history. This
can be due to one of the following cases:
(a) A known reward: The planner already observed that x2 = 1, which is the maximum
possible reward. From that time, the recommended action is σt = 2, as it has the maximum
possible reward.
(b) An unknown reward: The observed realizations have the minimum possible reward, i.e.,
x1 = −1 and maybe x3 = −1. Given this realization, we know that E[ut (2)] = µ2 > x1
(and in case that x3 = −1, also E[ut (2)] = µ2 ≥ x3). This makes action 2 the best action to
execute, considering the history.
(2) Exploration driven recommendation: The planner has not yet observed an action with
the best possible reward (i.e., 1), and observed x1 = 0. Since we assume that 0 > µ2 > µ3,
such a recommendation would not benefit for agent t (but the planner is recommending it
since it might benefit future agents).
Fortunately, the agents do not know the realizations of the actions’ rewards, hence cannot infer
the reason for their recommendations. This is where the information asymmetry translates into an
advantage for the planner, and enables her to maximize social welfare.
3.1 Information States
It would be very useful to partition the histories depending on the information that the planner
has, regarding the realized values of the actions. Since we have only three actions, we have at most
three realized values, and we can encode them in a vector of length three. We use the ∗ symbol
to indicate that a value is still unknown. For example, 〈0,−1, ∗〉 implies that we know that x1 = 0,
x2 = −1 and we never explored the value of X3. Any history of the first t − 1 agents which is
compatible with ®z = 〈0,−1, ∗〉 is assigned to the information state S ®zt . The recommendation to the
t-th agent would depend on the planner’s information state.
Note that the agents do not know the planner’s information state. However, given the recom-
mendation σt , and the planner policy π , they can deduce the probabilities of each state, conditioned
on the recommendation σt they received. Those probabilities allow them to test whether the rec-
ommended action is indeed BIC, i.e., maximizes their expected reward given the information they
observe.
Going back to example 3.1, we can now describe it using information states.
Example 3.2. Consider a recommendation to agent t , σt = 2. Every possible reason for it can be
one of the following:
(1) States that result in exploitation driven recommendation, action 2 either has:
(a) A known reward: The planner has already observed action 2’s reward and it is the
maximum possible reward. I.e., the planner is in one of the following information states:
S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t , S
〈−1,1,−1〉
t , S
〈0,1,−1〉
t or S
〈0,1,∗〉
t .
(b) An unknown reward: The only action with a better prior expected reward compared to
action 2, action 1, has been explored and resulted in minimal reward (i.e, x1 = −1). Action
2 that now has the best utility, has not yet explored. We denote this state with S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
t .
(An additional possible state is S
〈−1,∗,−1〉
t where the planner also observed that x3 = −1.)
The set of these exploitation states is denoted by Γ
j+
t , for the reason that following a recom-
mendation for action j in such states produces higher expected utility for agent t compared
to action 1.
(2) States that may result in exploration driven recommendation: Action 2 has not been
explored yet, whereas x1 = 0. This implies that the planner is either in information state
S
〈0,∗,∗〉
t , or in information state S
〈0,∗,−1〉
t .
The set of these exploration states is denoted by Γ
j−
t , for the reason that following a rec-
ommendation for action j in such states produces lower expected utility for agent t then
selecting action 1.
3.2 The optimal BIC recommendation algorithm
Given the information states, we can describe the planner’s recommendation policy. The recom-
mendation policywill map the information states to recommended actions. In the case of an “Explo-
ration driven Recommendation” the mapping would be stochastic, to make sure that the incentives
are maintained. Algorithm 3-actions is described in Table 1, defining what recommendation to
give in each information state.
Algorithm 3-actions uses two functions, f 2t (y) and f
3
t (y), which control the exploration and
are based on a mutual parameter y, which will be selected uniformly at random in [0, 1]. The
states are marked also as terminal states if there is a unique recommendation for all future agents,
and exploration if the recommended action might not have the highest expected reward (S ®zt ∈ Γ
j−
t ).
States not marked as exploration result in a exploitation driven recommendation, and are therefore
exploitation states (S ®zt ∈ Γ
j+
t ).
Looking at Algorithm 3-actions in Table 1 might be intimidating, however, in most of the
information states the recommendations are rather straightforward. In the initial information state,
i.e., 〈∗, ∗, ∗〉, the only BIC recommendation is action 1, since the first agent knows that the planner
has no additional information beyond the prior. In any information state in which some xi = 1,
the planner recommends that action, the agents get the maximum reward, and the state does not
change (i.e., terminal state). In any information state in which all the realized actions are xi = −1,
the planner recommends an unexplored action with the highest expected reward, the agents get
the maximum expected reward, and after it the state does change to include the new explored
action.
The main challenge is in the cases that the realized value of action 1 is x1 = 0 and 0 > µ2 > µ3.
In such information states we have a tension between the agent incentive, to perform action 1 and
maximize her expected reward, and the planner incentive to explore new actions to the benefit of
future agents. Indeedwe have two information states in which we explore stochastically, balancing
between the incentives of the agent and making the recommendation BIC. In information state
〈0, ∗, ∗〉 the planner explores with some probability action 2, and in information state 〈0,−1, ∗〉 the
planner explores with some probability action 3.
We stress that the stochastic exploration is not done in an “independent” way, but rather in a
coordinated way through the parametery ∈ [0, 1], which is selected initially uniformly at random,
and never changes. The property that we will have is that while we are in information state 〈0, ∗, ∗〉
we eventually have an agent that explores action 2, and its index is f 2(y). Similarly, while we are
in information state 〈0,−1, ∗〉 we eventually have an agent that tries action 3, and its index is f 3(y).
Recommendation Table. Policy Parameters: (y, t)
State Information state Recommendation (σt ) Terminal Exploration
S
〈∗,∗,∗〉
1 X1 = ∗ 1
S
〈1,∗,∗〉
t X1 = 1 1 X
S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 X1 = −1,X2 = ∗ 2
S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t X1 = −1,X2 = 1 2 X
S
〈−1,−1,∗〉
3 X1 = −1,X2 = −1,X3 = ∗ 3
S
〈−1,−1,1〉
t X1 = −1,X2 = −1,X3 = 1 3 X
S
〈−1,−1,−1〉
t X1 = −1,X2 = −1,X3 = −1 1 X
S
〈0,∗,∗〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = ∗ f
2
t (y) ∈ {1, 2} X
S
〈0,1,∗〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = 1 2 X
S
〈0,−1,∗〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = −1,X3 = ∗ f
3
t (y) ∈ {1, 3} X
S
〈0,−1,1〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = −1,X3 = 1 3 X
S
〈0,−1,−1〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = −1,X3 = −1 1 X
S
〈0,∗,−1〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = ∗,X3 = −1 infeasible[corollary 3.14] X
S
〈0,∗,1〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = ∗,X3 = 1 infeasible[corollary 3.14] X
S
〈0,1,−1〉
t X1 = 0,X2 = 1,X3 = −1 infeasible[corollary 3.14] X
Table 1. Algorithm 3-Action’s recommendation policy
We need to take special care to make sure that agent f 2(y), which explores action 2, is different
than agent f 3(y), which explores action 3. (Clearly, each agent can explore at most one action.)
This is why we use a coordinate sampling (to be defined later).
We also show that some information are never reachable, namely, 〈0, ∗, 1〉, 〈0, ∗,−1〉 and 〈0, 1,−1〉.
This will be due to the fact that for any y ∈ [0, 1] we will show that f 2(y) < f 3(y), which implies
that we complete the exploration of action 2 before exploring action 3. As we extend to k actions,
we use the same y to coordinate between the stochastic exploration of all the actions. Then again,
by showing that for any pair of actions i < j , it holds that f i (y) < f j (y), we deduce that the order
in which the actions are explored is from the a priori highest expected reward to the lowest, i.e.,
2, 3, . . . ,k .
3.3 Exploration Rates
In this section we formalize the exploration rate that the planner can have. A BIC exploration
rate, denoted by q, measures the probability that a BIC recommendation σt = j is given when
the planner is in some exploration state. Namely, for any BIC recommendation policy π , the BIC
exploration rate is
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
Prpi [S
®z
t ,σt = j], where Prpi [S
®z
t ,σt = j] is the probability that the planner
is in S ®zt at time t , and recommends to explore action j , assuming that all the recommendations until
the current agent use π .
Let πˆ denote a BIC recommendation policy that recommends actions base on Table 1 (or Table 2
for k > 3 actions) and uses maximum BIC exploration rates for every agent t and for every j ∈ A.
We explain exactly how are exploration driven recommendations assigned to agents in a way that
maximizes exploration rates in subsection 3.6.
Maximal BIC exploration rate, denoted by q
j
t is the maximum probability of exploration, subject to
the BIC constraints, and bounded by the probability that the planner is in exploration state at time
t with j as a recommended action. I.e., q
j
t is the solution of
q
j
t = maxq q
s.t.
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j+
t
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt |σt = j] E[ut (j) − ut (1)|S
®z
t ,σt = j] + µ j
q
Prpˆi [σt = j]
≥ 0
0 ≤ q ≤
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt ].
(1)
The first constraint makes sure that σt is a BIC recommendation. Its first summand is a summa-
tion taken over each exploitation state probability, multiplied by the “gain” from choosing action
j instead of action 1 in this state. The second summand is the “loss” of the agent, namely the prior
expected reward of action j (i.e., µ j ), multiplied by the exploration rate q and divided by the prob-
ability of the event σt = j (which includes also the exploration probability q). The terms “gain”
and “loss” are from the agent’s perspective. By looking at Table 1, we can see that when σt = j
is given in exploitation state, the expected utility difference is positive, therefore the agent has a
“gain” of reward in these states. On the other hand, as we assume that µ j < 0, the agent has a
“loss” of reward in the exploration states (all of which share x1 = 0). When this entire expression
is non-negative (i.e., the first constraint holds), it is BIC.
Notice that πˆ is defined as a BIC policy, and as such every recommendation σt = j is BIC, i.e.,
its BIC constraints must be met for every action i , j . We argue that in πˆ , if the BIC constraint
of action j compared to action 1 is satisfied, all the other BIC constraints for agent t are met.
Therefore, we only refer to the BIC constraint with respect to action 1 when calculating q
j
t . The
reason is that for any pair of actions a < b, and for every y ∈ [0, 1], we show that f a(y) < f b (y),
i.e., the exploration of action a is done before the exploration of action b. Along with Table 1
that represents the recommendations of πˆ , we deduce that whenever a recommendation σt = j
is given, the reward of action j is either unknown (i.e, the expected reward is µ j > −1) or X j has
been observed and x j = 1. Now, for any action i such that 1 , i < j , f
i (y) < f j (y) yields that Xi
has been observed and xi = −1. As for every action j < i , since f
j (y) < f i (y) yields that Xi has
not to been sampled yet, and from the assumption that µi < µ j we know that µi < µ j ≤ E[ut (j)].
Either way E[ut (σt ) − ut (i)] ≥ 0.
The second constraint in (1) prevents the exploration rate from exceeding the probability that the
planner is in exploration state (S ®zt ∈ Γ
j−
t ). This guarantees that we can actually use of all ofq to give
an exploration driven recommendation. Namely, q =
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
Prpˆi [S
®z
t ,σt = j] ≤
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
Prpˆi [S
®z
t ].
Let nj denote the index of last agent t ≤ T that might explore action j , i.e., nj := arдmaxt (q
j
t > 0).
For convenience, for every agent t and action j , we denote
A
j
t :=

0 t < j
2p1jΠi< jp
−1
i +p
1
j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1−2p1j
t ≥ j
,
B
j
t :=

0 t < j
p01 −
∑t−1
m=2 q
2
m t ≥ j = 2
p−1j−1
∑t−1
τ=j−1 q
j−1
τ −
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ t ≥ j ≥ 3 .
3.4 Computing the Maximum BIC Exploration Rates
We now calculate the maximum BIC exploration rates. (The next lemma’s proof for k = 3, namely,
q2t and q
3
t , is in Appendix A, and the proof for k > 3, i.e., any q
j
t , is in Appendix B.)
Lemma 3.3. Given q22, . . . ,q
2
t−1, we have
q2t =
{
0 t = 1
min(A2t ,B
2
t ) t ≥ 2 ,
(2)
And for action j ≥ 3, given qiτ for i ≤ j − 1 and τ ≤ t − 1, assuming q
j−1
t−1 = A
j−1
t−1 and t ≤ nj−1, we
have
q
j
t =
{
0 t < j
min(A
j
t ,B
j
t ) t ≥ j .
(3)
In addition we show that q
j
t ≤ p
−1
j−1A
j−1
t−1.
The next lemma derives the value of q
j
t (without an assumption on q
j−1
t−1).
Lemma 3.4. For action j ≥ 3, given qiτ for i ≤ j − 1 and τ ≤ t − 1, such that t > nj−1, we have
q
j
t =
{
0 t < j
min(A
j
t ,B
j
t ) t ≥ j .
(4)
The following are consequences of Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.5. For every j > 1, the exploration rate of agent j for action j is strictly positive, i.e.,
q
j
j > 0.
The following lemmas relate the exploration rates q
j
t and the parameters A
j
t and B
j
t .
Lemma 3.6. For every action j and agent t > j and that q
j
t−1 > 0, it holds that A
j
j ≤ A
j
t−1 < A
j
t .
Lemma 3.7. For every action j , for every nj ≥ t > nj−1, it holds that
(1) B
j
t−1 > B
j
t ≥ 0.
(2) q
j
t > 0.
(3) If q
j
t = B
j
t (> 0), then it holds that q
j
t+i = B
j
t+i = 0 for every i ≥ 1, therefore t = nj and we stop.
3.5 Properties of the Exploration Rates
The policy assigns exploration driven recommendations of actions to agents while maximizing all
exploration rates simultaneously. In this subsection we show properties regarding the exploration
rates which later enable to have correlated randomization between agents and actions. It would
also help us to show in subsection 3.6 and section 4 that as a BIC policy that recommends actions
base on Table 1 (or Table 2 for k > 3 actions) and maximizes exploration rates, πˆ : (1) has a well-
defined implementation (that assigns a single action for every agent), (2) eventually reaches a
terminal state, and (3) maximizes expected social welfare. The following theorem is a corollary to
Lemmas 3.3 - 3.7, and states the exact exploration rates.
Theorem 3.8. For action 2 and for agent t we have,
q2t =

0 t = 1
2p−11 p
1
2+p
1
2
∑t−1
m=2 q
2
m
1−2p12
2 ≤ t < n2
p01 −
∑n2−1
m=2 q
2
m t = n2
0 t > n2
,
for action j ≥ 3 and agent t we have,
q
j
t =

0 t < j
2p1jΠi< jp
−1
i +p
1
j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1−2p1j
j ≤ t < nj
p−1j−1
∑nj−1
τ=j−1 q
j−1
τ −
∑nj−1
τ=j q
j
τ t = nj
0 t > nj
.
Let ρ j = p
0
1Π
j−1
i=2p
−1
i . We show that ρ j is the total exploration rate of action j .
Lemma 3.9. ForT ≥ nk , the probability for exploration driven recommendation for any action j is
ρ j , i.e.,
Pr[∃t : σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] = ρ j .
3.6 Determining the explorers- correlating across agents and actions
We now explain how the algorithm chooses which agent will explore each action. Recall that the
planner knows the history ht−1, and therefore knows the current state at time t , as defined in
Table 1. Table 1 has clear recommendation for any exploitation state (i.e., any state that is not
marked as exploration).
Before explaining how the policy chooses recommendation for the exploration states q
j
t with
a special correlated randomization technique, we want to point out two problems that occur by
simply recommending agent t to explore action j with probability q
j
t independently of the other
agents and actions. First, is that agents might be sampled to explore two (or more) actions, which
will delay the exploration of all but one of the actions, as the planner can only recommend one
action per agent. Second, is that action j might be explored before the planner knows the rewards
of 2, . . . , j − 1, which we later show that is not optimal.
We now return to describe how the planner should select which action to recommend based
on Table 1. Knowing the current information state, the planner sets πt (ht−1) = vt to be the corre-
sponding recommendation for this state in Table 1. Together with the policy parameters and the
functions f j that we later define in Definitions 3.10 and 3.11, respectively, she returns σt ∼ vt as
the recommended action.
Definition 3.10. a valid input for our algorithm is a triple 〈y, t ,Q〉 such that:
(1) y ∈ [0, 1] is a real number that is sampled from a uniform distribution in [0, 1].
(2) t indicates the agent number (the agent for which the algorithm is run).
(3) Q = {qj |j ∈ {2, ...,k}} is a set that contains exploration rates vectors for each action exclud-
ing action 1, such that qj [t] := q
j
t (i.e, the exploration rate for agent t with j as recommended
action).
We now define the functions f j that determines which agent will explore action j .
Definition 3.11. Let f j : [0, 1] → {1, ...,nj } be the function that maps a real number y ∈ [0, 1]
to an agent t such that
f j (y) = argmaxt (
t−1∑
τ=1
q
j
τ < yρ j ).
Let f
j
t : [0, 1] → {1, j} be the function for action j and agent t that maps a real number y ∈ [0, 1]
to a recommendation for agent t , i.e., σt , and is defined as follows:
f
j
t (y) :=
{
j f j (y) = t
1 else
.
The following lemma shows that different actions are explored by different agents, and that
better a priori actions are explored always earlier.
Lemma 3.12. For every y ∈ [0, 1], and for every action j , f j (y) < f j+1(y).
Since f j (y) = nj , Lemma 3.12 implies the following corollaries.
Corollary 3.13. For every action j , it holds that nj + 1 ≤ nj+1.
Corollary 3.14. Action j is explored before any action i > j , making every state S ®zt such that
S ®zt [j] = ∗ and S
®z
t [i] , ∗ (e.g., S
〈0,∗,−1〉
t ) infeasible for every agent t . Namely,
Γ
j−
t = {S
®z
t |S
®z
t [1] = 0,∀1 < i < j : S
®z
t [i] = −1,∀i ≥ j : S
®z
t [i] = ∗]}.
Hence, |Γ
j−
t | = 1.
We finish this section by showing that the policy πˆ has a well-defined implementation in a sense
that every agent gets exactly one action as a recommendation in Theorem 3.15.
Theorem3.15. Recommendation policy πˆ has a well-defined implementation recommendation pol-
icy, since for every y ∈ [0, 1], and for pair of actions action i , j , f i (y) , f j (y), and there exists
t ∈ {1, . . . ,nj } such that f
j (y) = t . This implies that every agent receives a recommendation for
exactly one action.
4 OPTIMALITY
4.1 Finite exploration
Clearly the flow between the information states is acyclic. From Table 1, when the planner is in
a non-terminal state, she is exploring, with some probability. This implies that after nk (the last
agent that might explore action k), there is no more exploration. Therefore, πˆ will eventually reach
a terminal state and thus complete the exploration. From this we derive the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. By using the policy πˆ , as long as the planner has not observed an action j with x j = 1,
she will keep exploring until all actions’ rewards are revealed. Therefore πˆ always reaches a terminal
state. Formally, if at time t action j is the a priory best action with an unknown reward, ®z[j] = ∗, and
for every action j ′ does not have optimal reward, ®z[j ′] , 1 implies that Prpˆi [σt = j] > 0 and therefore
S ®znk+1 is terminal.
4.2 Minimum exploration time
Two BIC planners may differ only in their recommendations when they are in the exploration
states. We would prefer the one that explores the actions "faster", as it would mean finding the
optimal action sooner. For this we define a partial order between policies. We say that a policy is
stochastic dominant over another if it discovers the realizations of the rewards faster.
Definition 4.2. A BIC policy algorithm πA is stochastic dominant over another BIC policy algo-
rithm πB if for every prior D and for every agent t , πA has at least the same probability to observe
action j’s reward as πB , and for some action j a strictly higher probability to know it’s reward in
time t . I.e., for any agent t and action j we have PrpiA [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] ≥ PrpiB [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗], and
there exists some action j and agent t for which PrpiA [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] > PrpiB [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗].
The following lemma states that the suggested policy, πˆ is stochastic dominant over all other
BIC policies.
Lemma 4.3. Let πA , πˆ be a BIC policy algorithm, with the same recommendations for the ex-
ploitation states as in Table 1. Then πˆ is stochastic dominant over πA
From Lemma 4.3 we easily obtain that πˆ maximizes exploration rates of each action j and agent t .
Due to the use ofy ∈ [0, 1] to decide which agent will explore each action, πˆ manages to maximize
exploration rates of all the actions independently. This give us an important result regarding πˆ :
Theorem 4.4. The policy πˆ minimizes the time until terminal state .
4.3 Maximum expected social welfare
In this sectionwe present themain result: The best BIC policy is the one that minimizes exploration
time for every action simultaneously.
Theorem 4.5. Let πopt be a BIC policy algorithm that maximizes the expected Social welfare. Then
for a large number of agents (specifically, T ≥ ⌈ 1
p1
k
+ nk − 1⌉), it holds that
SWT (πopt ) = SWT (πˆ ).
From the above theorem we deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 4.6. Recommendation policy πˆ maximizes social welfare for everyT ≥ ⌈ 1
p1
k
+ nk − 1⌉.
4.4 Limited number of agents
The planner’s goal is to maximize social welfare. If there is a limited number of agents, she cannot
rely on the existence of the agent that balances the loss of social welfare (i.e., agent t1 in the proof
for Theorem 4.5). Our algorithm must be adjusted for that. A natural solution is to limit the rec-
ommendation for exploration, so that the planner must give exploration driven recommendation
for action j in round t if the gain for the following agents, p1j (T − t − 1) is high enough to cover for
the expected loss of the t-th agent, i.e., µ j . We add the following requirement that must be fulfilled
if the algorithm gives an exploration driven recommendations to agent t . Namely,
(T − t) · p1j + µ j ≥ 0.
Alternatively, (T − t + 2) · p1j ≥ 1.
Theorem 4.5’s proof still applies for any pair 〈j, t〉 that meets the additional requirement. For
pairs 〈j, t〉 that do not meet the requirement, action j is no longer recommended for exploration in
round t or afterwards. An exploration driven recommendation for these agents harms the social
welfare.
5 CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTION FOR THE A PRIORI BEST ACTION’S REWARD
In this section we explore the same model with one significant difference. The prior distribution
D1 is now a continuous distribution that has full support of [−1, 1]. (Note that we do not allow
mass points.) Consider that the number of agents,T , is large enough so that a social planner must
complete the exploration of all the actions.
The different type of recommendation policy algorithm we introduce for this setting is a gener-
alization of the partition policy, originally defined in Kremer et al. [10].
5.1 Partition policy as a recommendation algorithm
The following two definitions are used to define a partition policy (in Definition 5.3).
Definition 5.1. Θj is a collection ofT disjoint sets, Θj := {θ
j
t }
T
t=2, where θ
j
t ⊆ [−1, 1].
Definition 5.2. A valid input for any partition policy algorithm is a series Θ = (Θj )kj=2 s.t. for
any pair of actions i , j ∈ A, it holds that θ
j
t ∩ θ
i
t = ∅ for every agent t .
Definition 5.3. Given a valid input, (Θj )kj=2, and a realization X1 = x1, a partition policy is a
recommendation policy that makes the following recommendations. For agent t we have,
(1) For t = 1 we have σ1 = 1.
(2) If there is an explored action j with a reward of 1 (i.e., it is optimal), then σt = j .
(3) Else, if x1 ∈ θ
j
t then σt = j . (In this case agent t is the first agent for whom σt = j .).
(4) [−1, µ j ] ⊆ θ
j
j .
(5) Else, σt = 1.
Let us inspect each clause in the above definition with regards to BIC and social welfare.
(1) Since action 1 is the a priori better action, any BIC policy must recommend to agent t = 1
action σ1 = 1 (clause (1)).
(2) After finding an explored action with value 1, to maximize the social welfare we must rec-
ommend it (clause (2)).
(3) Clause (3) is where action j is recommended for the first time. Once the planner will observe
the value of the explored action, if it is 1 it will be recommended to all future agents (as
indicated in clause 2).
(4) Clause (4) deals with the case that the a priori best action has low value. Togetherwith clause
2, it guarantees that agent j performs action j if none of the explored actions has a higher
reward.
(5) Clause (5) gives an exploitation recommendation. Note that any explored action j , in this
case, has x1 ≥ x j = −1.
Notice that a valid input, (Θj )kj=2, insures that every agent t ≥ 2 receives a recommendation for
exactly one action. We can now derive the following lemma:
Lemma 5.4. The optimal BIC recommendation policy is a partition policy.
5.2 The suggested BIC Partition Policy
Recall that agent t finds that recommendation σt to be BIC if for any action i ∈ A we have
E[ut (j) − ut (i)|σt = j] ≥ 0.
Note that this holds if and only if for any action i ∈ A
Pr[σt = j] · E[ut (j) − ut (i)|σt = j] ≥ 0.
Namely, ∫
σt=j
[X j − Xi ]dD ≥ 0.
We now describe how to extract parameters for the suggested policy iteratively, given a prior D
for the problem. Thenwe continue by showing that these collections can be used as a valid input of
a partition policy. Finally, we show that using these parameters produces a BIC recommendation
policy.
Definition 5.5. The sets Θˆj = {θˆ
j
t }
T+1
t=2 are calculated as follows.
Let θˆ
j
t be the ordered interval (i
j
t , i
j
t+1], where:
• For t < j , θˆ
j
t = ∅ (this can be done by setting i
j
t := −1 for t ≤ j).
• For t = j , recall that i
j
j = −1, and let ω
j
j+1 be the solution to:
j−1∏
n=2
(p−1n )
∫
µ j ≥X1
[µ j − X1]dD1 =
∫
µ j ≤X1≤ω
j
j+1
[X1 − µ j ]dD1. (5)
• For every t > j , let ω
j
t+1 be the solution to:
p1j
∫
−1≤X1≤i
j
t
[1 − X1]dD1 =
∫
i
j
t <X1≤ω
j
t+1
[X1 − µ j ]dD1. (6)
• i
j
t+1 =min(1,ω
j
t+1) for every t ≥ j . (We have θˆ
j
t = (i
j
t , i
j
t+1].).
Notice that in each step, distribution D, the parameters p1j ,p
−1
n , µ j and i
j
t are known, therefore
one can compute the value of i
j
t+1.
In the next lemma, we show that i
j
t ≤ i
j
t+1 for every action j and agent t . This will allow us to
deduce in Corollary 5.7 that Θˆj is a collection of disjoint sets, which is required from a valid input
for partition policy.
Lemma 5.6. For every action j , 1 and agent t ∈ T , it holds that i
j
t ≤ i
j
t+1.
Corollary 5.7. For every action j , since there is no intersection between the ordered intervals
(i
j
t , i
j
t+1] for every agent t , Θˆj is a collection of disjoint sets.
For (Θˆj )kj=2 to be well defined we need to verify that there is no intersection for the same agent
t for different actions (as stated in Definition 5.2). In the next lemma we show that for every agent
and action 〈t , j〉 the right bound of θ
j+1
t is smaller than the left bound of θ
j
t .
Lemma 5.8. For every t ≥ j , it holds that i
j
t ≥ i
j+1
t+1, and there is an equality only if i
j
t = i
j+1
t+1 = 1.
Let πˆ be a partition policy that uses the suggested parameters, (Θˆj )kj=2, as an input.
Corollary 5.9. πˆ is well defined, as for every x1 ∈ [−1, 1] there exists exactly one action j ∈ A
such that σt = j .
We now investigate what is required from a BIC partition policy, in order to show that the
suggested partition policy is BIC. Following the same exhaustion demonstrated in Example 3.1,
for every agent t ≥ 2 a BIC recommendation for action j , 1 can be either exploration driven or
exploitation driven:
(1) Exploitation driven recommendation: Action j , 1 is the best action given the history.
Once again, one of the following holds:
(a) A known reward- Action j has the best possible realized value (i.e., x j = +1) after one
of the previous agents j ≤ τ < t has explored it. Formally, the expected "gain" of agent t
from choosing action j over of action 1 in this case is∫
X j=1,X1∈∪τ <tθ
τ
j
[X j − X1]dD = p
1
j
∫
X1 ∈∪τ <tθ
τ
j
[1 − X1]dD1.
(b) An unknown reward- The observed realization x1 yields lower reward compared to the
prior expected reward of action j , i.e., x1 < µ j (< · · · < µ2), and the better a priori actions,
k < j have been explored and resulted in minimal reward of −1. Thus action j is better to
execute then action 1, and the expected "gain" here is
j−1∏
n=2
(p−1n )
∫
µ j ≥X1
[µ j − X1]dD1.
(2) Exploration driven recommendation: The planner has not yet observed an action with
the best possible reward (i.e., +1), and x1 > µ j . This recommendation does not benefit with
agent t (but might yield higher expected social welfare hence is possible by the planner). The
expected "loss" in this case is:∫
µ j<X1,X1∈θ
t
j
[X j − X1]dD =
∫
µ j<X1,X1∈θ
t
j
[µ j − X1]dD1.
Taken together, the summation of the expected gains and loss is equivalent to the left hand sides
of the integrals in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.10. A recommendation σt = j , 1 is BIC w.r.t. action 1 if for t = j we have,∫
µ j<X1,X1∈θ
j
t
[µ j − X1]dD +
j−1∏
n=2
(p−1n )
∫
µ j ≥X1
[µ j − X1]dD1 ≥ 0, (7)
and for t > j we have, ∫
X1 ∈θ
j
t
[µ j − X1]dD + p
1
j
∫
X1 ∈∪τ <tθ
τ
j
[1 − X1]dD1 ≥ 0. (8)
Notice that for t > j , X1 ∈ θ
j
t yields X1 ≥ µ j since the sets are disjoint and according to clause (4) in
definition 5.3, [−1, µ j ] ⊆ θ
j
j .
Let us compare the BIC constraints in above lemma to the suggested series, Θˆ.
If i
j
t = 1, then from Lemma 5.6 and the definition of i
j
t , it holds that i
j
t+1 = 1, which yields θˆ
j
t = ∅.
Since both parts of (6) are zero in this case, so the (exploitation driven) recommendation σt = j is
BIC. Else, i
j
t = ω
j
t , in which case (5) and (6) satisfy (7) and (8) respectively. This allows us to derive
the following corollary.
Corollary 5.11. The partition policy πˆ that uses the series Θˆ as input, outputs BIC recommenda-
tions σt = j w.r.t. action 1 for every agent t .
Due to exploration of the a priori better actions earlier, it is sufficient for the suggested partition
policy, πˆ to maintain the BIC constraint w.r.t. action 1 alone. I.e., if σt = j is an exploration driven
recommendation, then j has the lowest index of an unexplored action (and therefore has the highest
expected value among all unknown rewards.). Agent t would not prefer any other action i , j as
such a behavior would yield either a lower prior reward for actions i > j or the lowest possible
reward (i.e., −1) for actions i < j . The following are corollaries of the last lemma.
Theorem 5.12. πˆ is a BIC partition policy.
Corollary 5.13. πˆ recommends the actions in ascending order, i.e., for every j < i , action j is
explored before action i .
5.3 Optimality
We follow the same logic process of the proofs provided in Section 4 with some tiny adjustments.
The abstraction of the information states is used here with one small difference- considering all
the BIC policies recommend action 1 to the first agent and observe reward x1 ∈ [−1, 1], we update
the definition of stochastic dominant to be conditioned on x1 as follows.
Definition 5.14. A BIC policy algorithm πA is stochastic dominant over another BIC policy algo-
rithm πB if for every prior D and a realization x1 ∈ [−1, 1], and for any agent t , πA has at least the
same probability to observe action j’s reward as πB , and for some action j a strictly higher proba-
bility to observe it’s reward in time t . I.e., for any agent t , action j and realization x1 ∈ [−1, 1] we
have PrpiA [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗|®z[1] = x1] ≥ PrpiB [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗|®z[1] = x1], and there exists some agent t
and action j for which PrpiA [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗|®z[1] = x1] > PrpiB [S
®z
t ∧ ®z[j] , ∗|®z[1] = x1].
The next step is to show the partition policy with the suggested parameters as input yields
stochastic dominance. It is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.15. Let (Θj )
k
j=2, and the realization X1 = x1, be the input for a (BIC) partition policy
πA , πˆ . Then πˆ is stochastic dominant over πA.
From Lemma 5.15 we deduce that πˆ maximizes exploration for each action j and agent t . Due to
the use of disjoint sets in the definition of a partition policy, πˆ manages to maximize exploration
rates independently. This gives us the important result of time minimization:
Theorem 5.16. πˆ minimizes the time until terminal state.
Finally, we show the main result for this case as well.
Theorem 5.17. πˆ maximizes social welfare for unlimited number of agents.
6 CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
This paper explores the problem of incentivizing exploration via Bayesian persuasion. We consider
two different supports for the a priori better action, a discrete version {−1, 0, 1}, and a continuous
version [−1, 1]. In both settings, our optimal policy explores the better a priori actions earlier. In
addition, it maximizes the exploration, subject to the BIC constraints. This leads to a planner policy
that maximize the social welfare.
Our optimal policy also achieves both: (1) minimizing the time until all of the actions are ex-
plored, and (2) that all the actions are explored, in case of large enough T . Our optimal policy
requires special correlated randomization to guarantee the optimality.
There are few obvious open problems, First, to extend the support of all actions to be, for exam-
ple [−1,+1]. Second, to consider stochastic actions, even simple Bernoulli random variables with
different probabilities. Third, enabling the agents to receive limited amount of information about
the past. (The challenge here is to make the information informative, and still allow the planner
to explore all actions, eventually.)
6.1 The case of continuous distribution for all actions’ reward
Let us discuss a case in which the support of each action’s reward is [−1, 1]. In order to tackle such
setting, a change in Definition 5.3 is required. First, unless all rewards are known there is no action
with optimal reward, hence clause (2) must be removed. Second, clause (5) should be changed to
σt = argmaxjx j , so that exploitation driven recommendation with known reward would have the
best reward.
The issue is that while the BIC constraints w.r.t. the a priori best action hold in such policy, the BIC
constraints w.r.t. the other actions do not (automatically) apply anymore. Consequently, one must
also update how the algorithm selects which agent should explore which action. For example, if
agent 5 receives a recommendation for action 3 (i.e., σ5 = 3) and there is a very low probability
that either x2 or x1 are smaller than µ3 and µ3 is slightly bigger than −1. In this case, agent 5 knows
that it is highly unlikely for such a recommendation to benefit her, and might prefer action 2 over
this recommendation.
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A MISSING PROOFS FROM SECTIONS 3, 4 AND 5
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We prove here lemma forq2t and q
3
t , i.e., j = 3, and the full proof, for j ≥ 4,
can be found in Appendix B. The values q2t ’s are stated in the theorem, and we will show that they
satisfy the required conditions. In addition we state the values of q3t , and later show that they also
satisfy the required conditions,
q3t =

0 t < 3
min(
2p13p
−1
1 p
−1
2
1−2p13
,p−12 q
2
2) t = 3
min(
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
3+p
1
3
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ
1−2p13
,p−12
∑t−1
τ=2 q
2
τ −
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ ) t > 3
(9)
Finally we need to show that q3t ≤ p
−1
2 q
2
t−1.
In the following, we calculate exploration rates for πˆ , and just for notational convenience, we
will refer to Prpˆi [ ] simply as Pr[ ]. The first agent, by knowing her place in line, knows that none of
the actions have been explored yet. Hence, it is for her best interest to choose action 1, the action
with the maximal prior expected reward. Therefore, it is necessary that q21 = 0 for πˆ to be BIC
policy. Consequently, the first agent explores action 1, and gains reward of u1(1) = x1. As for the
second agent, the planner can now use her knowledge of x1 for σ2. If x1 = 1, (the best possible
reward), since she wishes to maximize the social welfare, she must recommend action 1 to the
rest of the agents, i.e., S
〈1,∗,∗〉
t is a terminal state with maximal social welfare. If x1 = −1, action
2 currently has the best expected reward, i.e., µ2 > µ3 > −1 = x1. It also does not decrease the
reward comparing to the known reward of action 1. Therefore, any social BIC planner (including
πˆ ) must recommend on action 2 in this round, i.e., σ2 = 2. If x1 = 0, although action 2 is not the
best action for agent 2, a social planner would probably want to recommend it to the second agent,
at least with some probability. For that she uses her advantage of knowing the realization of action
1’s reward. Note that q22 influences the second agent only when x1 = 0.
To complete the definition of the recommendation for the second agent, we calculate the value of
q22. The expected utility of agent 2 for following the recommendation must be at least the expected
utility of choosing action 1. Therefore, q22 satisfies the BIC constraint, i.e.,
E[u2(2) − u2(1)|σ2 = 2] Pr[σ2 = 2] = (µ2 − (−1)) Pr[S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 |σ2 = 2] Pr[σ2 = 2] + µ2q
2
2 ≥ 0.
Information state S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 always leads the planner to recommend σ2 = 2, therefore
Pr[S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 |σ2 = 2] Pr[σ2 = 2] = Pr[S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 ,σ2 = 2] = Pr[S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 ]
According to Table 1, the above is true for any action j and exploitation state S ®zt ∈ Γ
j+
t , which all
have in common a corresponding recommendation σt = j . For this reason, for S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j+
t , we can
replace Pr[S ®zt |σt = j] Pr[σt = j] by Pr[S
®z
t ].
Recall that q22 not only must satisfy the above constraint but also satisfy the second part of (1).
Hence,
(1 + µ2) Pr[S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 ] + µ2q
2
2 ≥ 0 and q
2
2 ≤ Pr[S
〈0,∗,∗〉
2 ]
Since, µ2 = 2p
1
2 − 1, Pr[S
〈0,∗,∗〉
2 ] = p
0
1 , and Pr[S
〈−1,∗,∗〉
2 ] = p
−1
1 , we have
q22 = min(
2p12p
−1
1
1 − 2p12
,p01) .
We proceed to calculate the first positive value of q3t . Due to the assumption µ2 > µ3, agent 2 can
deduce that action 3 has not been explored yet, consequently she would definitely not follow a
recommendation to choose action 3, therefore, q32 = 0. Consider recommending action 3 to agent
3, i.e., σ3 = 3. This recommendation can occur when the planner is in either exploitation state
〈−1,−1, ∗〉, or exploration state 〈0,−1, ∗〉 . The BIC constraint is:
E[u3(3) − u3(1)|σ3 = 3] Pr[σt = 3] = 2p
1
3 Pr[S
〈−1,−1,∗〉
3 ] + µ3q
3
3 ≥ 0
We again maximize over q33, subject to the second constraint in (1) as well, i.e.,
q33 ≤
2p13p
−1
1 p
−1
2
1 − 2p13
and q33 ≤ Pr[S
〈0,−1,∗〉
3 ] + Pr[S
〈0,∗,∗〉
3 ] = p
0
1 − q
2
2p
1
2
Since for t = 3 and j = 3, we assume that q22 = A
2
2, we have
q33 ≤ A
3
3 =
2p13p
−1
1 p
−1
2
1 − 2p13
<
2p12p
−1
1 p
−1
2
(1 − 2p12)
= A22p
−1
2 = q
2
2p
−1
2 = q
2
2(1 − p
1
2) ≤ p
0
1 − q
2
2p
1
2
it implies that,
q33 = min(
2p13p
−1
1 p
−1
2
1 − 2p13
,q22p
−1
2 ) (10)
Since 0 < p−11 ,p
−1
2 ,p
1
2,p
1
3 < 1, and µ3 = (2p
1
3 − 1) < 0, we get that both the numerator and the
denominator of q33 are positive, therefore
q33 > 0 (11)
We now prove by induction on agent t , the following:
q3t ≤ p
−1
2 q
2
t−1 (12)
This assumption assures that every time πˆ recommends σt = 3, it is done after action 2 has been
explored. (This will be clear after we define f 2(y) and f 3(y), however, observe that the exploration
rate of the third action is bounded by the exploration of the second action up to the previous agent
times the probability that the second action realization is −1.) This will imply that Pr[S
〈0,∗,−1〉
t ] =
Pr[S
〈0,∗,1〉
t ] = Pr[S
〈0,1,−1〉
t ] = 0. This will simplify the derivation, as a recommendation σt = 2
can come from only two exploitation states, S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t , S
〈0,1,∗〉
t , or from S
〈0,∗,∗〉
t , the only exploration
driven state that may cause recommendation for action 2.
For the induction base, consider agent t = 3. Indeed, q33 ≤ q
2
2p
−1
2 from (10). For the induction
step, assume that (12) holds for every time t < t0. The exploration rates, q
2
t and q
3
t+1 for each agent
t = t0 can be derived from the following the constraints in (1). Starting with q
2
t .
E[ut (2) − ut (1)|σt = 2] Pr[σt = 2] = 2 Pr[S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t ] + µ2q
2
t + Pr[S
〈0,1,∗〉
t ] ≥ 0 (13)
The probabilities of each mentioned state are as follows.
• Pr[S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t ] = p
−1
1 p
1
2 . Also, note that S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t is a terminal state.
• Pr[S
〈0,1,∗〉
t ] is the intersection of the following events:
– Action 2 has been explored before agent t , i.e.
∑t−1
τ=2 q
2
τ , so (implicitly) action 1 has already
sampled and x1 = 0.
– Pr[X2 = 1] = p
1
2
– This is a terminal state, so no further events.
Combining all with (13),
2p−11 p
1
2 + (2p
1
2 − 1)q
2
t + p
1
2
t−1∑
τ=2
q2τ ≥ 0
and q2t = Prpˆi [σt = 2, S
〈0,∗,∗〉
t ] ≤ Prpˆi [S
〈0,∗,∗〉
t ] ≤ p
0
1 −
∑t−1
τ=2 q
2
τ . So,
q2t =min(
2p−11 p
1
2 + p
1
2
∑t−1
τ=2 q
2
τ
1 − 2p12
,p01 −
t−1∑
τ=2
q2τ )
As for q3t , the recommendation σt = 3 can come from the exploitation states S
〈−1,−1,1〉
t and S
〈0,−1,1〉
t
(recall that Pr[σ3 = 3|S
〈−1,−1,∗〉
3 ] = 1, which implies that agent 3 will perform action 3, and therefore
any agent t ≥ 4 has Pr[S
〈−1,−1,∗〉
t ] = 0), or from the only exploration state relevant for agent t ,
S
〈0,−1,∗〉
t . Hence, the BIC constraint is
E[ut (3) − ut (1)|σt = 3] Pr[σt = 3] = 2 Pr[S
〈−1,−1,1〉
t ] + µ3q
3
t + Pr[S
〈0,−1,1〉
t ] ≥ 0
substituting the probabilities we have
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
3 + (2p
1
3 − 1)q
3
t + p
1
3
t−1∑
τ=3
q3τ = 0
Note that
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ implicitly states that x1 = 0 and that x2 = −1, or else action 3’s reward might
has been revealed by exploitation, or it still unknown, but did not revealed by exploration. In order
for q3t to be a valid, it must also satisfy
q3t = Pr[σt = 3, S
〈0,−1,∗〉
t ] ≤ Pr[S
〈0,−1,∗〉
t ] = p
−1
2
t−1∑
τ=2
q2τ −
t−1∑
τ=3
q3τ
where p−12
∑t−1
τ=2 q
2
τ is the probability that there was an agent before agent t that explored action 2,
and x2 = −1. From this probability we subtract the probability that action 3 has been explored, i.e.,∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ , so that up until agent t the state is 〈0,−1, ∗〉 Therefore,
q3t = min(
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
3 + p
1
3
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ
1 − 2p13
,p−12
t−1∑
τ=2
q2τ −
t−1∑
τ=3
q3τ )
We can upper bound q3t as follows
q3t ≤
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
3 + p
1
3
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ
1 − 2p13
≤
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
2 + p
1
2
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ
1 − 2p12
the second inequality is correct due to the assumption that p13 < p
1
2 . From the induction hypothesis
(12) we know thatq3τ ≤ p
−1
2 q
2
t−1 for every τ ≤ t−1. Since, for t and j = 3we assume thatq
2
t−1 = A
2
t−1,
we have,
q3t ≤
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
2 + p
1
2
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ
1 − 2p12
≤
2p−11 p
−1
2 p
1
2 + p
1
2p
−1
2
∑t−2
τ=2 q
2
τ
1 − 2p12
= p−12 A
2
t−1 = p
−1
2 q
2
t−1 .
By using the induction hypothesis again, with (11), we get 0 <
∑t−1
τ=3 q
3
τ < p
−1
2
∑t−2
τ=2 q
2
τ , thus
q3t ≤ p
−1
2 q
2
t−1 ≤ p
−1
2 q
2
t−1 + p
−1
2
t−2∑
τ=2
q2τ −
t−1∑
τ=3
q3τ = p
−1
2
t−1∑
τ=2
q2τ −
t−1∑
τ=3
q3τ
which completes the proof of (12) and the proof of the theorem. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. First, we show that if action j is recommended for agent t > nj−1, then
action (j − 1)’s reward has been observed. If t > nj−1 then q
j−1
t = 0. From the constraints in (1)
regarding action j − 1 for t > nj−1 ≥ j , as the “gain” part is strictly positive and the “loss” part
is strictly negative, we get that
∑
Γ
(j−1)−
t
Prpˆi [S
®z
t ] = 0. Therefore, all the states for which action j is
explored before action j−1 are infeasible for agent t as theywere for t ≤ nj−1 andwe get to continue
the induction without relying on q
j
t ≤ p
−1
j−1A
j−1
t−1. Hence, we get exactly the same constraints for
action j as for the case of t ≤ nj−1, i.e.,
E[ut (j) − ut (1)|σt = j] Pr[σt = j] = 2p
1
jΠi<jp
−1
i + (2p
1
j − 1)q
j
t + p
1
j
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ ≥ 0
and also,
q
j
t ≤ p
−1
j−1
t−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ
which completes the proof of the lemma. 
proof of Lemma 3.6. The proof is by induction over t . For the induction base consider t = j .
From Lemma 3.5, we have that A
j
j ≥ q
j
j > 0, therefore
A
j
j =
2p1jΠi<jp
−1
i
1 − 2p1j
<
2p1jΠi<jp
−1
i + p
1
jq
j
j
1 − 2p1j
= A
j
j+1
For the inductions step, we assume that the induction hypothesis holds for t and prove it for t + 1.
From the inductive hypothesis we have that A
j
t−1 < A
j
t . If q
j
t > 0, we get
A
j
t =
2p1jΠi<jp
−1
i + p
1
j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1 − 2p1j
<
2p1jΠi<jp
−1
i + p
1
j
∑t
τ=j q
j
τ
1 − 2p1j
= A
j
t+1
which proves the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3.7. We show this lemma by induction over action index j . For the base of
the induction, consider action j = 2. We prove the case of action 2 by induction over t . For this
induction we use the base case of t = n1 + 1 = 2 (since agent 1 always explores action 1). We have
(1) B22 ≥ q
2
2 > 0 = B
2
1 .
(2) 0 < q22, directly from Lemma 3.5.
(3) q12 = 0 .
(4) If q22 = B
2
2 = p
0
1(> 0), we show by induction that for every i ≥ 1 it holds that q
2
2+i = B
2
2+i = 0.
For base consider i = 1. Then by using Lemma 3.6 we get
q23 =min(A
2
3,B
2
3) =min(A
2
3,p
0
1 − q
2
2) =min(A
2
3,p
0
1 − p
0
1) =min(A
2
3, 0) = 0 .
For the induction step assume this property holds for i−1 and show for i . From the induction
hypothesis and Lemma 3.6 we get
q22+i =min(A
2
2+i,B
2
2+i ) =min(A
2
2+i ,B
2
2+i−1 − q
t
2+i−1) =min(A
2
2+i , 0) = 0
For the induction step we assume that hypothesis of the lemma holds for action 2 and for every
agent ≤ t − 1, and show it for t .
(1) From the induction hypothesis q2t−1 > 0, so we get
B2t−1 = p
0
1 −
t−2∑
m=2
q2m > p
0
1 −
t−1∑
m=2
q2m = B
2
t
(2) Since B2t−1 > B
2
t and that q
2
t−1 = A
2
t−1 (or else t > n2), and we know that A
2
t−1 > 0 from
Lemma 3.6. Therefore,
q
j
t = min(A
j
t ,B
2
t ) < min(A
j
t ,B
2
t−1) = min(A
j
t ,q
2
t−1) > 0
(3) If q
j
t = B
2
t (> 0), we show by induction that for every i ≥ 1 it holds that q
2
t+i = B
2
t+i = 0. For
base consider i = 1. Then by using Lemma 3.6 we get
q2t+1 =min(A
2
t+1,B
2
t+1) =min(A
2
t+1,B
2
t − q
2
t ) =min(A
2
t , 0) =min(A
2
t , 0) = 0 .
For the induction step consider that this property holds for i − 1 and show for i . From the
induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.6 we get
q2t+i =min(A
2
t+i ,B
2
t+i ) =min(A
2
t+i ,B
2
t+i−1 − q
2
t+i−1) =min(A
2
t+i , 0) = 0
So the hypothesis of the lemma holds for action j = 2.
We now assume that it holds for every action ≤ j−1 and show it for action j , again by induction
over t . For base, consider t = j
(1) B
j
j ≥ q
j
j > 0 = B
j
j−1.
(2) 0 < q
j
j , directly from Lemma 3.5.
(3) If q
j
j = B
j
j (> 0), we show by induction that for every i ≥ 1 it holds that q
j
j+i = B
j
j+i = 0. For
the induction base consider i = 1. Then by using Lemma 3.6 and the since we assume that
t = j > nj−1, it holds that q
j−1
j = 0 therefore
q
j
j+1 =min(A
j
j+1,B
j
j+1) =min(A
j
j+1,B
j
j + p
−1
j−1q
j−1
j − q
j
j ) =min(A
j
j+1,p
−1
j−1q
j−1
j ) =min(A
j
j+1, 0) = 0 .
For the induction step consider that this property holds for i − 1. Since t = j > nj−1, it holds
that q
j−1
j+i−1 = 0. Using Lemma 3.6, we get
q
j
j+i =min(A
j
j+i ,B
j
j+i ) =min(A
j
j+i ,B
j
j+i−1 − q
j
j+i−1 + p
−1
j−1q
j
j−1+i ) =min(A
j
j+i , 0) = 0
For the induction step we assume that the hypothesis of the lemma holds for agent t − 1 and for
both actions j − 1 and j . We now show that it holds for agent t with action j .
(1) Since t > nj−1 we get
t∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ =
t−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ =
nj−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ
And from the induction hypothesis 0 < q
j
t−1, hence
B
j
t = p
−1
j−1
nj−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ > p
−1
j−1
nj−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−2∑
τ=j
q
j
τ = B
j
t−1
(2) From the induction hypothesis and t ≤ nj we get 0 < B
j
t . From Lemma 3.6, 0 < A
j
t , therefore
0 < q
j
t .
(3) If q
j
t = B
j
t (> 0), we show by induction that for every i ≥ 1 it holds that q
j
t+i = B
j
t+i = 0. For
the induction base consider i = 1. Then by using Lemma 3.6 and the since t > nj−1, it holds
that q
j−1
t = 0,therefore,
q
j
t+1 =min(A
j
t+1,B
j
t+1) =min(A
j
t+1,B
j
j + p
−1
j−1q
t−1
j − q
j
t ) =min(A
j
t+1,p
−1
j−1q
t−1
j ) =min(A
j
t+1, 0) = 0 .
For the induction step consider that this property holds for i − 1. Since t = j > nj−1, it holds
that q
j−1
t+i−1 = 0. Using Lemma 3.6, we get
q
j
t+i =min(A
j
t+i ,B
j
t+i ) =min(A
j
t+i ,B
j
t+i−1 − q
j
t+i−1 + p
−1
j−1q
j
t−1+i ) =min(A
j
t+i , 0) = 0

Proof of Lemma 3.9. For every t1 < t2, it holds that [σt2 = j, S
®z
t2
∈ Γ
j−
t2
]∩[σt1 = j, S
®z
t1
∈ Γ
j−
t1
] = ∅,
since if σt1 = j then S
®z
t2
< Γ
j−
t2
. From Theorem 3.8, it implies that
Pr[∃t : σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] =
T∑
t=1
Pr[σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] =
nj∑
t=j
q
j
t = B
j
nj +
nj−1∑
t=j
q
j
t
We now prove by induction on action j the following:
Pr[∃t : σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] = ρ j
The induction base is done for action j = 2 as follows
Pr[∃t : σt = 2, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
2−
t ] = q
2
n2
+ Σ
n2−1
t=1 q
2
t = p
0
1 −
n2−1∑
τ=2
q2τ +
n2−1∑
t=1
q2t = p
0
1
Suppose the induction hypothesis is true for action j − 1. For action j we have,
Pr[∃t : σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] = q
j
nj + Σ
nj−1
t=1 q
j
t = p
−1
j−1
nj−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
nj−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ +
nj−1∑
t=1
q
j
t = p
−1
j−1
nj−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ
From the induction hypothesis we have that
Pr[∃t : σt = j − 1, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
(j−1)−
t ] =
nj−1∑
t=j−1
q
j−1
t = ρ j−1
We get
Pr[∃t : σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] = p
−1
j−1
nj−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ = p
−1
j−1ρ j−1 = ρ j
which completes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3.12. From the definitions of f j (y), we get
f j (y) + 1 = argmaxt+1(
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ < yρ j ) = argmaxt+1(
t−1∑
τ=j
p−1j q
j
τ < yp
−1
j ρ j )
Since q
j+1
τ+1 ≤ p
−1
j q
j
τ for every agent τ < t ≤ nj from Lemma 3.3, and p
−1
j ρ j = ρ j+1, we get
f j (y) < f j (y) + 1 ≤ argmaxt+1(
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j+1
τ+1 < yρ j+1) = argmaxt+1(
t∑
τ=j+1
q
j+1
τ < yρ j+1) =
argmaxt (
t−1∑
τ=j+1
q
j+1
τ < yρ j+1) = f
j+1(y)
hence f j (y) < f j+1(y) for every y ∈ [0, 1]. 
[. Proof of Lemma 3.15] The first part, f i (y) , f j (y), is direct consequence of Lemma 3.12. As
for the second part, for every action j and each agent t , q
j
t ≥ 0 and
∑nj
t=1 q
j
t = ρ j , by Lemma 3.9.
We also have monotone increasing exploration between agents- for every j ≤ t < nj − 1 and for
every j ∈ {2, ...,k − 1}, q
j
t < q
j
t+1, as a result of Lemma 3.6 (A
j
t < A
j
t+1) and Lemma 3.8 (q
j
t = A
j
t ).
Let y ∈ [0, 1]. Then f j (y) = argmaxt (
∑t−1
τ=1 q
j
τ < yρ j ). From the above get
0 = q
j
1 ≤
t−1∑
τ=1
q
j
τ ≤
nj∑
τ=1
q
j
τ = ρ j
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. For action j ∈ {2, . . . ,k} let (ψ j )kj=1 denote the exploration rates used in
πA, i.e.,
ψ
j
t =
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
PrpiA [S
®z
t ,σt = j]. Both πA and πˆ are BIC policy algorithms, with the same recom-
mendations for exploitation states. This implies that the only difference between the probabilities
of πA and πˆ to know action j’s reward at time t (i.e., the probability S
®z
t [j] , ∗) is the difference
between the sum of exploration rates of action j until time t . Meaning that for every BIC policy π
with the same recommendations for exploitation states like πˆ ,
Pr
pi
[S ®zt ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] =
t−1∑
τ=1
∑
S ®zτ ∈Γ
j−
τ
Pr
pi
[S ®zτ ,στ = j] + Pr
pi
[∀i < j : xi = −1, j < t]
The sum
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
S ®zτ ∈Γ
j−
τ
Prpi [S
®z
τ ,στ = j] is the sum of all exploration rates of action j until t − 1,
therefore
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] − Pr
piA
[S ®zt ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] = Σ
t−1
τ=jq
j
τ − Σ
t−1
τ=jψ
j
τ
for every agent t .
For contradiction, suppose that there exists a prior, D, an action j and time t1 such that
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt1 ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] < PrpiA
[S ®zt1 ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] , (14)
where j is the least such action and t1 is the least such agent for action j .
Every q
j
t was calculated inductively so that it would attain a maximum value and maintain the
constraints in (1), independent of the other actions. Therefore it is not possible that there exists
time t0 < t1 such that ψ
j
t = q
j
t for every t < t0 and ψ
j
t0
> q
j
t0
. If ψ
j
t = q
j
t for every t < t1, then
ψ
j
t1
≤ q
j
t1
.
So let t0 < t1 denote the first time that there is lower exploration rate in πA for action j rather
than in πˆ , i.e., t0 = argmint<t1ψ
j
t < q
j
t andψ
j
t = q
j
t for every t < t0. Hence, the probability that πA
is in exploitation state at time t = t0 + 1 w.r.t. πˆ is lower, i.e.,∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j+
t
Pr
piA
[S ®zt |σt = j] =
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j+
t
Pr
piA
[S ®zt ] <
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j+
t
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt ] =
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j+
t
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt |σt = j] ,
and the probability that πA is in exploration state at time t = t0 + 1 w.r.t. πˆ is higher, i.e.,∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt ] <
∑
S ®zt ∈Γ
j−
t
Pr
piA
[S ®zt ] .
Since E[ut (j) − ut (1)|S
®z
t ,σt = j] and µ j depend only on the prior D, their value remain the same.
As a result ofψ
j
t0
< q
j
t , the exploration rate of action j in πA at the next time, t0 + 1 that maintains
the constraint is smaller than it could have been while using πˆ , and for every time t > t0 it holds
that ψ
j
t ≤ q
j
t . This is true for every time t0 < t1 such that ψ
j
t0
< q
j
t0
and therefore contradicts (14).
Therefore,ψ
j
t ≤ q
j
t for every action j and agent t
The difference between the policies indicates that there is an action j agent t withψ
j
t , q
j
t . Since
ψ
j
t ≤ q
j
t , it implies thatψ
j
t < q
j
t and we get
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt+1 ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] < PrpiA
[S ®zt+1 ∧ ®z[j] , ∗] , (15)
Which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.5. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a prior D, such
that
SWT (OPT ) = ED [Σ
T
t=1ut (πopt (ht−1))] > ED [Σ
T
t=1ut (πˆ (ht−1))] = SWT (πˆ )
πopt maximizes expected social welfare, therefore it is easy to see that πopt must give the same
recommendation as in Table 1 whenever that social planner is in exploitation state. Since πopt
and πˆ are different,there is at least one agent t , that might not receive the same recommendation
from the two policies i.e., (vt )piopt , (vt )pˆi . We have already established that this scenario can only
happen when the planner is in exploration state. Therefore, it is a result of difference between
exploration rates in both policies for at least one action j . Let t0 and j denote the first indexes of
such agent and action, respectively. It is easy to see that if t0 > nj then πopt is not in a terminal
state and therefore does not maximizes social welfare. So assume t0 ≤ nj . Let (ψ
j
t )piopt denote the
exploration rate used by πopt , and let ϵ denote the difference between this exploration rate, and
in πˆ , i.e., ϵ = q
j
t0
− (ψ
j
t0
)piopt . Let π be a policy identical to πopt that substitutes (ψ
j
t0
)piopt with
q
j
t0
. Recommendation policy π is a well defined BIC policy as t0 is the first index of j for which
(ψ
j
t0
)piopt is not the maximum value, q
j
t0
is a BIC exploration rate, and from Lemma 4.3, the rest of
the exploration rates can still be used.
Let t1 be the agent such that t1 = ⌈t0 +
1
p1j
− 1⌉. Since t0 ≤ nj ≤ nk and p
1
j ≥ p
1
k
, it holds that
t1 ≤ ⌈nk +
1
p1
k
− 1⌉ = T . Now, since
SWT (π ) − SWT (πopt ) ≥ ED [Σ
t1
t=t0
ut (πopt (ht−1))] − ED [Σ
t1
t=t0
ut (π (ht−1))]
We get
SWT (π ) − SWT (πopt ) ≥ ϵ((t1 − t0)p
1
j + 2p
1
j − 1) = ϵ((
1
p1j
− 1)p1j + 2p
1
j − 1) = ϵp
1
j
contradicting the optimality of πopt . 
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Let j , 1 be some action. The proof is by induction over t .
For the induction base, consider t ≤ j − 1, for which i
j
t = i
j
t+1 = −1.
For the induction step, we assume the induction hypothesis holds for t and prove it for t + 1.
The left-hand sides of (5) and (6) are non-negative since i
j
t ≤ 1, X1 < 1, 0 < p
1
n and p
1
j > 0.
Consequently, the right-hand sides are also non-negative. So from (5) we deduce −1 < µ j < i
j
j+1
and from (6) and the induction hypothesis we deduce ω
j
t+1 ≥ i
j
t and as a result, i
j
t+1 ≥ i
j
t . 
proof of Lemma 5.8. Let j , 1 be some action.The proof is by induction over t .
For the base case, consider t = j , for which i
j
j = µ j > µ j+1 = i
j+1
j+1 .
For the induction step, we assume the induction hypothesis holds for every agent ≤ t .
Consider t = j , then according to (5) ω
j
j+1 is the solution to:
j−1∏
n=2
(p−1n )
∫
µ j ≥X1
[µ j − X1]dD1 =
∫
µ j ≤X1≤ω
j
j+1
[X1 − µ j ]dD1 (16)
Now, since 0 < p−1j < 1 and µ j > µ j+1,
j−1∏
n=2
(p−1n )
∫
µ j ≥X1
[µ j − X1]dD1 >
j∏
n=2
(p−1n )
∫
µ j+1≥X1
[µ j+1 − X1]dD1
Putting the above inequality with (16) for both j and j + 1 we get,∫
µ j ≤X1≤ω
j
t+1
[X1 − µ j ]dD1 >
∫
µ j+1≤X1≤ω
j+1
t+2
[X1 − µ j+1]dD1
Since µ j > µ j+1 (and therefore −µ j < −µ j+1) ω
j+1
t+2 < ω
j
t+1 must hold.
For every t > j , according to (6) ω
j
t+1 is the solution to:
p1j
∫
−1≤X1≤i
j
t
[1 − X1]dD1 =
∫
i
j
t <X1≤ω
j
t+1
[X1 − µ j ]dD1 (17)
Combining the induction hypothesis (i
j
t > i
j+1
t+1) with p
1
j+1 < p
1
j we get
p1j
∫
−1≤X1≤i
j
t
[1 − X1]dD1 > p
1
j+1
∫
−1≤X1≤i
j+1
t+1
[1 − X1]dD1
Putting the above inequality with (17) for both j and j + 1 we get,∫
i
j
t <X1≤ω
j
t+1
[X1 − µ j ]dD1 >
∫
i
j+1
t+1<X1≤ω
j+1
t+2
[X1 − µ j+1]dD1
Now, since −µ j < −µ j+1 and we know that i
j
t > i
j+1
t+1 from the induction hypothesis, we get that
ω
j+1
t+2 < ω
j
t+1. Consequently, for every t ≥ it holds that i
j+1
t+2 ≤ i
j
t+1. 
Proof of Lemma 5.15. For contradiction, suppose that there exists a prior, D, an action j and
time t1 such that
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt1 ∧ ®z[j] , ∗|®z[1] = x1] < PrpiA
[S ®zt1 ∧ ®z[j] , ∗|®z[1] = x1] , (18)
where j is the least such action and t1 is the least such agent for action j . It means that πA recom-
mends to some agent j ≤ t < t1 to explore action j while ®z[j] = ∗ and (σt )pˆi , j . If (σt )pˆi = 1 it
means that θ tj = ∅, therefore from Lemma 5.4, πA is not a BIC policy (as it does not a valid partition
policy). So consider exploration driven recommendation (i.e., S ®zt ∧®z[i] = ∗∧®z[j] = ∗), (σt )pˆi = i < j
(since i > j contradictions Corollary 5.13). In such a case,
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt+1 ∧ ®z[i] , ∗|®z[1] = x1] > PrpiA
[S ®zt+1 ∧ ®z[i] , ∗|®z[1] = x1] , (19)
Hence πA is not stochastic dominant over πˆ . 
Proof for Theorem 5.17. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a prior D and
a realization X1 = x1, such that
SWT (OPT ) = ED [Σ
T
t=1ut (πopt (ht−1))] > ED [Σ
T
t=1ut (πˆ (ht−1))] = SWT (πˆ )
πopt maximizes expected social welfare, so according to Lemma 5.4 it must be a partition policy.
By differing from πˆ , there exist an action j and a time t1 in which (σt1 )pˆi = j and (σt1 )piOPT = i , j ,
where j is the least such action and t1 is the least such agent for action j . If i < j then action i is
already explored by both planners and xi = −1, and the result is a lower SW for OPT. If i > j , since
µi < µ j the result is a lower social welfare for OPT. Overall we get that SWT (OPT ) < SWT (πˆ ). 
X1 X j σt E[ut (j) − ut (1)|S
®z
t ,σt = j] Pr[S
®z
t ]
−1 ∗ j 2p1j 1[t = j]Πi<jp
−1
i
0 1 j 1 p1j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
−1 1 j 2 1[t = j]p1jΠi<jp
−1
i
0 ∗ f
j
t (y) ∈ {1, j} 2p
1
j − 1 p
−1
j−1
∑t−1
τ=j−1 q
j−1
τ −
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
Table 2. Extension for states that may recommend on action j
B K ACTIONS- FULL ALGORITHM AND MISSING PROOFS
In this appendix, we extend the algorithm for 3 actions to handle with any number of actions, k.
Recall that when calculating BIC constraints, we consider 3 different reasons for a recommenda-
tion, σt = j , as explained in Example 3.2. To handle with multiple actions’ rewards, we abandon
the explicit states, e.g., S
〈−1,1,∗〉
t . We intentionally dismiss any states where actions are, as we will
see that these states are infeasible by πˆ .
(1) Exploitation driven recommendation, action j either has:
(a) Aknown reward- The planner has already observed action j’s reward and it is indeed the
maximum possible reward, i.e., x j = 1. As we are about to show, such a scenario is possible
only when x1 ∈ {0, 1} and for every action 1 < i < j , it’s reward has been observed, and
xi = −1.
(b) An unknown reward- action j is yet to be explored, and every action i < j , has been
explored and xi = −1.
(2) Exploration driven recommendationAction j has not been explored yet, every i < j has
been explored, and xi = −1 for i < j , whereas x1 = 0. This implies that the planner is in the
exploration state of action j .
In Table 2, we are extending the algorithm described in Table 1 to all states that may result in
a recommendation for action j when using πˆ . We also added the gain of each state compared to
action 1 (i.e., E[ut (j)−ut (1)|S
®z
t ,σt = j]), as well as the probability that the planner is in these states
in round t (i.e., Pr[S ®zt |σt = j]).
A BIC exploration rate qtj for our algorithm is still the maximum value that satisfy the same
constraints as before (i.e., (1)).
Theorem B.1. For k actions, given q22, . . . ,q
2
t−1, . . . ,q
j−1
j−1, . . . ,q
j−1
t−1, for j > 2,
q2t =

0 t = 1
min(
2p−11 p
1
2
1−2p12
,p01) t = 2
min(
2p−11 p
1
2+p
1
2
∑t−1
m=2 q
2
m
1−2p12
,p01 −
∑t−1
m=2 q
2
m) t > 2
(20)
q
j
t =

0 t < j
min(
2p1jΠi< jp
−1
i
1−2p1j
,p−1j−1q
j−1
j−1) t = j
min(
2p1jΠi< jp
−1
i +p
1
j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1−2p1j
,p−1j−1
∑t−1
τ=j−1 q
j−1
τ −
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ ) t > j
(21)
In addition we show that
q
j+1
t+1 ≤ p
−1
j q
j
t (22)
Proof. The proof is done by induction over action j and agent t . The induction base and q2t ’s
part are provided by Theorem 3.3. For the induction step we assume that (21) and (22) holds for
any t0 < t and j0 < j .
As for q
j
t , by using the induction hypothesis, we know that an exploitation driven recommen-
dation σt = j can only come from the first three exploitation states described in Table 2. We also
know from it that an exploration driven recommendation can only come from the last state in Ta-
ble 2. For this we notice that Pr[S ®zt ] = Pr[S
®z
t ,σt = j] for every S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j+
t and that Pr[S
®z
t ,σt = j] = q
j
t
Hence, the BIC constraint for any agent t ≥ j is
E[ut (j) − ut (1)|σt = j] Pr[σt = j] = 2p
1
jΠi<jp
−1
i + (2p
1
j − 1)q
j
t + p
1
j
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ ≥ 0
Notice that the first and third state in Table 2 have the same value for
Pr
pˆi
[S ®zt |σt = j] E[ut (j) − ut (1)|S
®z
t ,σt = j]
Therefore we merged them. In order for q
j
t to be a valid, it must also satisfy
q
j
t = Pr[σt = j, S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ] ≤ Pr[S
®z
t ∈ Γ
j−
t ]
And by substituting S ®zt ∈ Γ
j−
t with the probability for the last state in Table 2 we get
q
j
t ≤ p
−1
j−1
t−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ
Therefore,
q
j
t = min(
2p1jΠi<jp
−1
i + p
1
j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1 − 2p1j
,p−1j−1
t−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ )
We can upper bound q
j
t as follows
q
j
t ≤
2p1jΠi<jp
−1
i + p
1
j
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1 − 2p1j
≤
2p1j−1Πi<jp
−1
i + p
1
j−1
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1 − 2p1j−1
the second inequality is correct due to the assumption that p1j < p
1
j−1. From the induction hypoth-
esis, we know that q
j
τ < p
−1
j−1q
j−1
τ for every τ ≤ t − 1. Hence,
q
j
t ≤
2p1j−1Πi<jp
−1
i + p
1
j−1
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ
1 − 2p1j−1
≤
2p1j−1Πi<jp
−1
i + p
−1
j−1p
1
j−1
∑t−2
τ=j−1 q
j−1
τ
1 − 2p1j−1
= p−1j−1A
j−1
t−1 = p
−1
j−1q
j−1
t−1 .
By using the induction hypothesis again, we get 0 <
∑t−1
τ=j q
j
τ < p
−1
j
∑t−2
τ=j−1 q
j−1
τ , thus
p−1j−1q
j−1
τ ≤ p
−1
j−1q
j−1
τ + p
−1
j−1
t−2∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ = p
−1
j−1
t−1∑
τ=j−1
q
j−1
τ −
t−1∑
τ=j
q
j
τ
which completes the proof. 
